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CAN NATIONAL IDENTITY BE BUILT
ON LOCAL DEMOCRA TIC TRADITIONS?
Experience with democratie education in Ethiopia.
Both dernocracy and national identity are challenged in Ethiopia today: Does national identity
concern Ethiopian citizenship - or the Amhara, the Tigre, the Oromo nationality? Is
democracy a project of the central government - or could it better be built on a revitalisation
of loe al traditions? At least for some of the ethnic groups or "nationalities" as they are
presently termed, it may seem that democracy could be a natural part of their traditional
identity, instrumental in distinguishing themselves from others and escaping from greater
Ethiopian embracement.
About one half of present day Ethiopia' s population, and two thirds of the territory, have been
conquered during the second half of last century. Most of these people associate "Ethiopian"
nationalism with the centralising experience under autocratic Emperors, in which they were
the victims of "Abyssinian" colonialism. A tiny elite of those conquered peoples were invited
to becorne "amharised", to be assimilated into the dominating power elite. They are today
vehemently criticising the decentralisation programme of the government as fermenting
"ethnic hatred and "divide-and-rule" policies. They propagate a crude and often chauvinist
nationalism of Ethiopian unity.
The rural majority were subjugated to a double exploitation as rural producers and colonial
subjects. For them, the central state was always experienced as the source of uncontrollable
power. Under the Emperors, the central Ethiopian state was associated with colonial exploita-
tion. Under the military regime of Mengistu, socialism and democracy became equally dis-
credited as an experience of growing terror and tightened control from above.
Actually, there was a short period during which peasants, especially in the "new" Ethiopian
areas in the South, made a different experience. The land reform of 1975 released the
peasants from an increasingly repressive and exploitative landlord dass. In some areas,
notably in Sidamo and Arsi, peasants were impatient with the military government for holding
back their liberation, and freed themselves even before the land reform law came into force.
The conflict between the peasants' desire to decide their own affairs in their local communi-
ties and the military's attempt to establish controlover the country, its people and resources
was probably the most critical political issue of the Mengistu period. Throughout this period
the peasants fought a losing battle. The peasant associations, formed in 1975 as organs for
peasant self-administration, were transformed into the lowest organs of state controlover
peasants. Taxes and contributions were increased step by step. Peasant communities were
subjected to unpopular and uprooting resettlement and vilagisation programmes. The
probably most hated and feared intervention of the military government were the arbitrary and
brutal campaigns for military conscription among peasant youth. Peasants became
increasingly disillusioned, withdrawing their loyalties from the Ethiopian state and retreating
from politics and from the marketplace.
.
Over the years this conflct has been interpreted from a number of different angles. It has
been seen as a question of resource appropriation (Eshetu 1986) and distribution (Fantu
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1989), in terms of the confrontation between centre and periphery (Payer 1974), peasant and
the military (Brüne 1986), or simply as marginalisation (Fantu 1989). It was also interpreted
as a conflct between local democracy and state control (Pausewang 1988, 1994), as a
struggle between peasants and the state (Brüne 1988 and 1990) or between peasants and the
urban elasses (Taye 1989). These views need not be contradictory: they overlap and
supplement each other. But they show in how complex a psychological and historical
landscape "nationalism" and "democracy" are to be reconciled. Other lines of conflet,
notably between different cultures; between Christian and Moslem faith, and even within
different Christian denominations; between different social groups etc. are cutting across such
eleavages, to form a complex web of interests and affiliations within which each individual
has to find his (or her) personal integrity and national identity.
Ethiopian democratie traditions
On central state leve!, Ethiopia has only authoritarian and autocratic traditions. And since
there was no experience of democratie rule at least since over 100 years, the population has
internalised a pattern of behaviour and an expectation that state authorities are central and do
not tolerate any challenge from local leveL.
Yet there are democratie traditions on localleveL. They are today the base for centrifugal
forces, demanding secession as the only remedy against being colonised and subjugated under
central despotic rule.
The Oromo are the most topical case in point. Their traditional "Gada" system has histori-
cally been a set of institutions of self-determination based on age groups. The rights to
participation of the Oromo pastoralists were bound up with sharing responsibility for
everybody's well-being within the family or elan. At the danger of simplifying, one might
say the community was integrated by elaborate obligations to share food and other goods
(maarro) and to participate in mutual aid (Taye 1989). A cyele of age groups, called gada,
distributed work and responsibilities (Asmarom 1963, 1973, Haberland 1963). One age group
would take care of the cattle, the community's most important wealth, while others would be
responsible for organising community activities, for protecting peace, or seleeting grazing
areas and coordinating the movement of cattle. Every individual had her or his place.
Everyone had a right to life, food, shelter, health care and education within the community's
resources. Everyone had also a responsibility to contribute his share, specified by the
obligations of their specific gada, and to ensure that these rights were maintained for all.
"Democracy", then, was a right to participate in decision making as well as in the use of
resources, in the work as well as in the responsibility. Gada gave the member of an Oromo
family both social security, community integration, personal identity , influence and pride.
However, such integrity was limited to small groups. The Oromo were tolerant in assimila-
ting individuals from other ethnic groups. But they were effcient in keeping 'the others' in
place as outsiders. Moreover, gada was adapted to the life situation of relatively small
pastoralist communities. Adopted to the larger unit of a state, gada has proven to be difficult
to practice. Therefore, when Oromo groups settled down and became agriculturalists, in an
environment exposing them to potential competors for land, they developed local kingdoms,
not democratie states. The reign of the Aba Jifar of Jimma is a case in point (Lewis 1965).
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Also the Amhara and the Tigre have their democratie traditions on locallevel. Though today
often overlooked, and considered by the Oromo as a tool of colonial and quasi-feudal exploi-
tatio'n, it is stil possible to identify the original democratie qualities in the "Rist" system of
governing the relations between man and land. Rist was originally, before the Abyssinian state
conquered it for its own purpose of extracting rural surplus, an institution to share community
responsibility for the fair distribution of land and the provision of basic resources to all its
members.
The Amhara had been agriculturalists for many centuries. Land was controlled by the
community but farmed individually. A right to life meant for them a right to a share in the
land of the community. This right, called rist, was associated with responsibilty for the
community. Pride in one's rist was not only an assertion of an inherited elaim to land, as
many foreign observers stated (Hoben 1973). Rist was also a basic right to membership in
a community, ineluding a share in the responsibility for a fair distribution of land. "Fair" did
not necessarily mean equal. Plots were allocated according to needs, which could differ
depending on family size, social obligations, and military and political functions. A widow
who had no oxen to plough would get help from neighbours who could afford it, as part of
their community obligations. In his own community, also a cripple or a beggar could expect
a share to live on. However, the definition as to who belonged to the community and who
was exeluded were rather narrow, de fine d by descent from a common aneestor. Even within
that family group, there was no equality. But there was a basic security, which was built on
common responsibility.
Pride in rist is also expressed in the Amharic word gebar, meaning a farmer, or a contributor.
The term refers to his contribution to the community, his commitment to the well-being of
all. In contrast, the English word 'farmer' or the German' Bauer' refer to the activity of rural
produetion, the French 'paysan', the English 'peasant or the Spanish ' campesino' indicate
rural residence, while the Scandinavian' bonde' or ' husbond' (a term living on in the English
word' husband') refers to the settler, who lives on his land as head of a household.
Rist was the base of peasant production; but the base of the Ethiopian state was a parallei
structure of (semi-) feudal rights called gult. In a simplified way one might define gult as
the right of the Emperors, and on their behalf the local rulers, to appropriate part of the
peasant s produce, in exchange for military protection, political leadership and social order.
There was, ideally - if not in practice, a delicate balanee of rights: A peasant would have to
abide with his gult lord as long as he live d under his rule. But if he felt his situation too
oppressive, he could decide to move to another place where he could elaim community
membership and hence access to land, because of his grandfathers' or his mothers' origin
from that area. And while a gult lord could coerce an individual peasant, he could never dare
to confront the peasantry as a group, or he would face their revolt.
Historical experience
Rist was in constant competition with the demands of the centralised authority, with the "gult"
rights of the nobility. In the 19th century, both rist and gult were modified and over-
shadowed, and changed in their charaeter, through the centralisation of the Ethiopian Empire.
For the Arnara and Tigre, this situation created a state of century-lasting rivalry for
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hegemony. For the majority of the (rural) Oromo, the centralisation meant colonisation,
exploitation, expropriation.
During the ' Scramble for Africa' , the gada of the Oromo and the rist of the Amhara, as well
as similar cultural practices of other national groups, were disintegrated and corrupted. The
vast resources needed to carry out the centralisation of the Empire as started by Teodoros,
established by Menilek and completed by Haile Selassie, were collected at the expense of
local communities. The Oromo areas in the South were conquered to increase Menilek's
power. The Oromo peasants' resources were used to pay for the weapons and the soldiers
with which they were conquered. Soldiers from the North were given local authority in the
South, paid through rights to land and other privileges. These people had no interest in
ploughing land themselves, but to collect part of its produce. So they became landlords,
locally called 'neftegna' (man with a gun). Their rights to land, being considered hereditary
and inalienable, were called 'rist-gult' or 'rist' (Pausewang 1990 b). Hence the Oromo's
abhorrence of the term ' rist' until today, as a tool of colonial domination.
The Amhara peasants were no less forced to contribute. When their gult lords were given
positions in the central army or administration, they left their vilages but kept their privileges
there. They continued to collect their part of the peasants' harvest every year, but no longer
performed their functions for the community, neither distributing their share in the vilage nor
employing peasants to work on their farms or in their rich households. While a nobleman
lived in the vilage, he might have collected half the village' s produce; but it was redistributed
within the community. Once he left, the vil age lost these resources, and had in addition to
finanee those social services and functions which before had been his responsibility.
The effect was the same in both cases. Pastoral and peasant communities alike became subju-
gated to a centralised political and economic structure which they had to finanee through
contributions and through new taxes. The interests of the centre were given priority over
those of the community, and the interests of export over home consumption. This destroyed
indigenous systems of social security. Communities were forced to conform to economic
rules that did not accommodate the practice of collective responsibilty.
Most of the resources produced were expropriated to finanee the government' s central
administration, the Imperial court and an expanding international trade. In the rural areas,
competition for the remaining local resources was severely sharpened. Peasants who had to
deliver more than half their produce, needed more land to produee sufficient food for their
families to survive on. The rist system degenerated into a cut-throat contest between
everyone for more land, in which people' s elosest relatives became their most dangerous
rivals because they owned the same elaims to rist land. Gada either disintegrated into an
order of social ranking of little practical consequence or disappeared totally .
It is thus no exaggeration to state that Ethiopia escaped colonisation by participating in
colonialism. Menilek's state in effect joined the ranks of the colonial powers to become the
only African colonial power Europe hesitatingly recognised. The fire arms Menilek used to
conquer the South and later to repulse the Italian colonial invasion came from Europe. The
European powers accepted his elaim because they understood that he offered therm access to
the resources they wanted. Once they had helped him build up his empire it was far cheaper
to control the area by trading with him than byenforcing European military controlover him.
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AfrIcan and European Traditions of Democracy
Democracy is mostly defined as government by the people. In consequence, free elections
are usually seen as the best indicator of democracy. But free elections are not sufficient:
majority rule has to be controlled and supplemented by protection for the rights of the
minorities. Generally, respect for the human rights of all citizens is seen as aneeessar
complement to democratie mechanisms of political steering.
Comparing African and European traditions of democracy, one observes easily that the
principles may be the same, but the balanee between different components may vary, and
some rights and principles may be taken better care of than others.
African concepts of democracy are based, not on ' one man, one vote', but rather on the
individual' s sense of belonging to a community. In African tradition, decisions are not made
by a majority vote, but through a debate aiming at a consensus. Anthropologists have
described the practice in many African societies whereby discussions go on and everybody
gets a chanee to speak until a solution is emerging which benefits the community and with
which everyone can go along. Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Y overi Museveni, each in
his way, referred to this tradition in developing their political projects.
Correspondingly, in the African legal tradition the community and not the individual is the
subject of justice. A traditional court is concerned primarily with reconciliation and
reintegration of the community, not with personal interests or individual justice. It attempts
to reintegrate a deviant into his society, to reconcile him with his adversaries, to re-open a
door to unit y and peace in the community.
This is fundamentally different from European-type democracy. In Europe it would be futile
to seek solutions through continuous palaver: If vital individual interests elash, a compromise
can not be found through debate. A decision can only be reached by the force of a majority
or of economic power. It would be equally futile in Africa to decide a dispute by a majority
vote which can not relieve the feeling of hurt prestige among those who "lost" the vote, nor
the nagging grudge of those who suffer material damage. Such loss becomes acceptable only
if it can be seen as a contribution for the sake of community integration.
This differenee indicates some inherent weakness i European type democracy: Liberal
concepts of democracy individualise decision making and dissolve responsibility. Following
a liberal model of the market economy, it assumes that the interest of the community wil be
taken care of if every individual takes care of his or her own interests. Accordingly, one
theory of democracy assumes that political parties should ' sell' their programmes to the
voters; the party that sells the best 'product', wil win most votes (Schumpeter-Downs model).
Between elections, held every four or five years, voters have neither influence nor responsi-
bility: they delegate both to their 'representatives' , who wil take care of their (individual)
interests. In such a model of democracy there is no space for community responsibility as
basis for individual identity, which is so important in Africa.
Another weakness in European practice of democracy is its standing aside from economic
decisions. In the economic field, private ownership rights precede democracy, and economIc
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responsibility relates to the owner, not to the community. Again, there is little space for co-
responsibility for all members, which is so fundamental in Africa.
On the other hand, African traditions may be weak in protecting the rights of minorities and
individuals. For centuries the beta israel (Falasha), the Nuer and Annuak (Shankalla), and
the artisans (juga) were minorities accused of having the buda (evil eye). They were ex-
eluded from community membership and, accordingly, deprived of equal economic and demo-
cratic rights. Even more, in historical times, slaves were segregated and left without
individual rights - though African societies knew the practice of assimilating slaves into their
community on an individual base. On a different leveL, women were deprived of most of the
community rights as far as participation is concerned, though they were normally ineluded
in the social security and the family identity through their husbands. The practice of female
circumcision is another aspect of severe interferenee with individual rights. It may not be
possible to list all groups being exposed to severe discrimination - both physically and
mentally handicapped people certainly need to be considered.
Whether a synthesis is possible, integrating the positive sides of both traditions, seems a
project for the future. It would ask for a democratie model in which decentralised individual
decision making is practised with responsibility for the well-being of the community, and
democratie control of the economic activities is combined with the protection of the rights of
minorities and generally of each individuaL.
Decentralisation
In consequence of historical experience, the EPRDF government after 1991 codified the
principle of "self-determination up to and ineluding secession" for all "nations, nationalities
and peoples" of the country. The right to self-determination was considered essential to give
the different groups (which were conquered after 1850) a consciousness ofbeing freed. Being
free to secede, it was expected that they would be enabled to gain the necessary self-
consciousness to understand that it was in their own interest to remain within the Ethiopian
federal state.
This policy was violently attacked by a majority of the urban and educated opposition in
Addis Ababa, as well as the exile community in the United States, as a "divide-and-rule"
tactic of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), trying to set the different ethnicities
up against one another, to be able to control the country. Tribalism, it was asserted, was the
only way for the Tigray, comprising only a small minority of the Ethiopian population, to
control the vast territory of Ethiopia and her population.
This argumentation overlooks the historie al situation in rural Ethiopia of 1991. The peasants'
experience of the Mengistu regime had brought them eloser to the national resistance
movements, which were the only opposition accessible to them. In 1977-78 Mengistu crushed
the urban opposition in the Red Terror campaign. To be young and to be educated, was
equally life dangerous in those days. Y oung intellectuals from the student movement and
others in the towns who did not want to give up, had only one choice - to retreat to their rural
home areas. Their only chanee to continue political activities was to join the existing national
liberation movements of their peoples.
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Once peasant self-determination had been undermined and reversed by a socialist central state,
the only alternative appeared to be a hope that national self-determination would offer
liberation from central state repression. An independent nation state of the Oromo, Tigray,
Afar or Sidamo appeared to be the last hope for many to win more influence and controlover
their own situation. The Eritrean issue had long since become a question of national
liberation from the central Ethiopian state. And there were national resistance movements
such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) ready to welcome the disilusioned socialists and
to offer them a new political platform. The national issue, defined as liberation movements
from Ethiopian colonial control, emerged as the new uniting denominator.
In 1974, the key to legitimacy of the new government of the Derg lay in solving the land
question. The land reform of 1975 was elearly a response to a compellng political demand
of necessity. In 1991, no new government could have hoped to win legitimacy without
solving the nationality issue. A far-reaching decentralisation was, at that moment, the only
chanee to keep Ethiopia together. It would be denying realities to ignore this need.
This does not necessarily deny the possibility that decentralisation gave the new authorities
a chanee to at least temporarily defuse some other burning issues, and possibly even to dilute
responsibility for some unpopular measures. However, all in all the decentralisation exercise
appears to have been met with more success than expected, and the accusation of "divide-and-
rule" tactics against the government has largely subsided. It appears that "ethnic nationalism"
is gradually loosing its importance, and criticism against the government for using it as a to ol
to dismantie Ethiopia is calming down. The only field where ethnic sentiments are continuing
to create resentments is the apparent building up of a Tigrean economic hegemony, directly
or indirectly controlled by the TPLF, and the allegations of an unfair concentration of
investments and development efforts in Tigray.
The decentralisation project is stil riled with problems. But few wil deny that it was, all in
all, a necessary exercise. And while the negative sideeffects are stubbornly persisting, its
positive features become slowly visible.
"Civil Society" or "Gada"?
"Civil society" is a fashionable term in Europe these days. Historically it goes back to the
writings of the German philosopher Hegel. His term "Bürgerliche Gesellschaft", translated
as civil society, indeed indicates the urban origin of the very idea. So was the entire concept
of Human Rights a product of the European Enlightenment philosophy, from the "Deelaration
des droits de l'homme et du citoyen" of 1789 and the Deelaration of Independence of the
United States in 1776 to the Universal Deelaration of Human Rights of 1948. Indeed, the
liberal project of human rights and democracy is born out of the demand of the citizens in
Europe and in the New World to free themselves from the restrieting control of the nobility,
as well as to free their economic dispositions and their political aspirations from the limiting
regulations of state control. As such, the European history of human rights and democracy
is the history of urban individualism and the commercialisation of urban life.
"Civil society" in Ethiopia today is a title monopolised by a small group of organised urban
people, who are vocal and have elear political opinions and interests. Their positions mirror
the ambiguity of the term "civil society" in a Third World country, where an urban minority
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is vocal and organised, and has no hesitation to present their interests as those of the "silent
majority", while the rural majority is silent and dispersed and without influence.
Dominated by a small group of urbanised intellectuals, whose interests have long since been
associated with a professional career in an urban setting, the relatively few organisations and
eireles which can today elaim to be the "civil society" stand for a solid "urban" view of
politics in Ethiopia. It would be highly misleading to take their views as those of the
democratie majority, given the fact that over 85 percent of the population live in rural areas,
and even of the urban population, a majority is uneducated and iliterate, and unable to
appreciate the values of a free press and freedom and of speech. However, there is no reason
to weigh the liberal traditions of democracy and human rights against the community-based
catalogue of rights as they are valued by the rural traditions. Rather, an attempt at integrating
the two traditions seems vital if the proeess started with decentralisation is to be completed
successfully. An attempt at co-existence of liberal civil rights and community-based
integrative rights is indeed essential if at all democracy is to win practical political relevanee
in a predominantly rural people.
However, any such attempt at a co-existence has to be critically aware that it has to bridge
over a serious conflct of interests, inasmuch as both concepts wil demand measures which
need resources. Hence, both concepts are bound to compete for resources from the state, and
strain the capacity of a state notoriously short of finance. Moreover, they wil compete for
the attention and concern in a bureaucracy and not least a judicial system staffed by predomi-
nantly urban-recruited, educated and raised personnel.
On the other side, there is far less manpower and material support to be expected. The
Oromo Liberation Front elaims that the superior democratie tradition of the Oromo could
offer a wealth of experience for building democracy. But in spite of such advantage (or
maybe because of it, as some suspect,) they feel exeluded from political positions with
influence on democratisation proeesses on state or regionalleveL.
Indeed, , Gada' as a model for building a new democratie spirit and practice, based on rural
local traditions of co-responsibilty, has its merit and attraction. Gada in its historical forms
had elected leaders (even though they were elected only from a limited group of eligible
candidates) being subject to change of leadership in regular intervals. Gada ineluded
everybody in the responsibility for the community, and offered a strong base for personal
identification and identity building. Being an Oromo meant being a member of a certain gada
age group, of a family, a tribe, a nation. This tradition, if consciously used, could build a
bridge to construet a rural, local based concept of democracy, to balanee the urban-based
european liberal project of the "civil society" with its emphasis on important, but insufficient
civil rights. Other ethnic groups would have their share to contribute, certain aspects of the
Ottuba system of the Sidamo, the Diesa of the Tigrigna, and others may supplement it. But
it appears that the Oromo possess the cultural and personal strength to be come the leading
force in developing a modern and functionable concept from their traditional cultural roots.
And they have understood their role in this proeess. Already in 1992, in a discussion one of
the leaders of the OLF said that, since the word "democracy" was discredited through
Mengistu's practice in the rural areas, why not call it "Gada" in future? What he referred to
was not just a new name, but developing a concept of democracy adapted to rural needs.
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Also within OPDO, similar ideas are contemplated. But OPDO is absorbed with rural admini-
stration in Oromia, hardly having the manpower and skils to get even a rudimentary local
administration working. Alone, they lack the capacity and the human resources to realise this
historical chance. All the more, there is reason to unite forces. And for the OLF, the project
of a new democratie concept built on local traditions, needs and human energies should be
so important that they can not afford any longer to sit aside, in exile. Their manpower, their
energies, their enthusiasm is needed in Ethiopia, in Oromia, to help build a new concept and
practice of democracy on the traditions and experience they elaim to represent. Against this
important task, other differences and animosities should have to be put aside.
But against such visions stands today the everyday experience of Oromo farmers, who see
that their peasant associations, now as before, are used to enforce the decisions of central
authorities, not to communicate their demands or interests up to the political leadership. They
experience that people in positions of authority demand obedience, and that authority means
the ability to enforce ones wil over others. An administrator who listens to people's demands
is in danger of being considered a "weak" leader. Hence, they expect that they have to obey
their leaders, but not that they could discuss with them how to promote their interests.
Democracy defined as local social security
Such attitudes wil not yield to a more democratie spirit unless a new experience gives reason
for changed expectations. The project of bu ilding democracy is, to a large extend, dependent
on building up confidence and self-esteem in a disilusioned and frustrated rural population.
Such a starting position is not enviable for any new start. It needs no less than building up
a modern system of rural-based social security, which could strengthen traditional experience
of co-responsibility coupled to a right of all to membership.
To be attractive to rural people with a however remote experience of traditional social
security patterns, it must inelude new guarantees for basic rights such as a right to life and
integrity, which means, in a rural context, a right to food. And since no economic power in
the world can feed all the Ethiopian people unless they feed themselves, it means by necessity
a right to work, to feed oneself with ones own work. This right can only be given in the
form of access to land.
The land questions thus reveals itself to be a central issue of rural-based democracy. In the
Ethiopian tradition, land is individually farmed, but controlled by the community. New forms
have to be found in which the land is allocated by the community under the co-responsibility
of all community members. This is one of the most contentious issues, as the urban majority,
in line with its individualised approach, believes in individual land ownership and a free
market of landed property.
Rural democracy would probably further demand basic guarantees to a right to health care
and education - within the limits of resource availability. It is likely that international
guarantees could help, not to offer immediately the realisation of health and education for all,
but a quick and tangible improvement on a widely dispersed scale. In the first place,
however, the communities would have to build on a revival of those traditional mutual aid
institutions that have survived in the rural areas or adjusted to urban conditions. These
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include the edir, the important neighbourhood burial associations, the equb, savings exchange
groups, the debo, vilage-based mutual aid groups, and maarro, the sharing obligations of the
Oromo, and other local institutions of social relevance.
But the communities wil not be able to provide basic social security, health care and
education if people are not aware of their entitlement and their right to demand such services,
and wiling to put it on the test. They have to recognise that they have a right, and even a
responsibility to insist on organising them.
They need backing from higher district and national authorities, which have to set standards,
coordinate efforts, train local health workers and teachers, food security monitors and store
keepers. And they require international institutions to guarantee help where communities are
unable to enforce their rights for want of resources or backing on the national level.
It was demonstrated many years ago that basic health and educational services could easily
be financed on a worldwide scale at a fraction of what is currently spent on development aid
(see Hopkins and Norbye 1978). However, international authorities can only reach the people
if the communities take the initiative and responsibility.
Local social security would give ro om to personal integrity, built on a right to participation
in the community, and co-responsibility for the integrity of others. This is another central
aspect of democracy, which brings this concept of democracy back close to the liberal ideas
in Europe, where Montesquieu twohundred years ago exclaimed: "I vehemently disagree with
what you say, Sir - but I would fight, if necessary risking my life, for your right to say it."
Integration in a community spirit characterised by such integrity , could give rise to a national
identity in which there is room both for local democracy, for a decentralised administration
in national states, and a federal Ethiopia strong enough to re-gain the loyalty of proud citizens
of different national origin.
Democracy defined as upward communIcation flows
In 1986, we observed a formidable communications gap between central authorities and
peasants. While political leaders were convinced that there was democratie discussion on
grassroots level, peasants knew to tell a different story. The rural administration, recently
built up, was made up of young, half-educated people who had escaped the Red Terror and
who did not want to be held responsible for any decision. They preferred to execute the
wishes of their superiors. They acted like a fiter between the peasants and the
administration: Any request from above was immediately executed as an order, even if it had
asked for the peasants' views. They wanted to be efficient and to quickly report back without
delays or problems. Information from the vilages to the authorities was sifted through and
only expressions of peasant satisfaction, support and well-being were reported. Anything that
could delay their success would be brushed aside. Complaints and critical ideas were filtered
out (Pausewang 1986, Mulugeta 1987).
Peasants had experienced a brief period of peasant self-determination and local democracy,
which started with the land reform of 1975 and the formation of self-administering peasant
associations. There was a wide variety of experiences during this period. Over substantial
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parts of the country, especially in the South where peasants had most reason to get rid or the
neftegna and take their affairs in their own hands, the land reform had opened a valve and
released a wealth of energy and initiative.
After this experience it is certainly no longer possible to claim that peasants are incompetent
and unable to take responsibility for local self-administration. They did it in 1976. There
were problems, no doubt - but they managed to solve them largelyon their own.
But the experiment was abolished already in 1977 - 78, paralleI to the Red Terror. The
government re-established complete economic and political control. Administratively, the
peasant associations became the executive organs of the state and were no longer democratie
organs of the peasants. The economic burden on the peasants was gradually increased.
Unfortunately, the role of the peasant associations - now generally termed rural kebele - has
not been redefined after 1991. In particular, there has been little effort on locallevel to re-
establish them as organs of peasant participation. There would have been an excellent
occasion to re-establish them as discussion forums where peasants could meet to form their
own political wil and communicate it to the higher authorities. Instead, it seems that local
authorities were quick to establish their controlover the rural kebele. As several observers
reported in 1995 (Tronvoll 1995, Aspen 1995, Poluha 1995), the cadres of Mengistu's
W orkers Party were replaced by cadres of the new governing group, but functioned as before
in the service of the authorities, transmitting their orders to the peasants, but not the peasants'
interests to the authorities.
If a rural democracy project is to succeed, it is essential that the rural democracy as practised
in the 1975 gebrewotch mahber (peasant associations) is re-established as general rural
practice. That is, it must become a routine again that peasants elect their leaders without
interferenee from above, and that peasant associations are encouraged to express their
members views, communicate them to the authorities and follow them up with active demand
to the authorities. It must be routine again, as in 1976, that peasant associations can tell the
zonal administrator: Y ou are there to serve us, and we expect you to come when we ask you
for explanations.
To function in such independence, peasant associations have to build on a spirit of co-
responsibility. A system of upward communication presupposes a web of loyalty different
from hierarchical organisations: leaders must feel responsible to their voters, and it must be
the guaranteed collective right of the peasant community, not the individual right of a peasant
leader, to demand rapport with the authorities higher up. It wil not work unless upward
communication flows are based on collective rights, as opposed to the liberal definition as
individual rights.
Democracy defined as national identity
This model sounds pretty utopian. But so is democracy an utopi a unless it is tried in practice
and applied, if not in its full extent, at least to a considerable degree. Democracy is never
perfeet, and unless it remains an utopia it wil most likely not remain a reality either.
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We believe that a solid democratie self-consciousness in a predominantly rural population can
emerge if people experience to be integrated in their community and have active influence
n the decisions that affect their lives and their future. Social security, local integration and
personal integrity depend on each other, and give the individual a self-esteem which makes
him (or her) proud of their community, region, and nation.
National identity, in other words, can be build on everyday experience of being an active and
respected part of a community, rather than on more mythical historical roots which are
conjured as an alternative to a depressing life situation and a gloomy future. Therefore it is
so important that decentralisation is not just an administrative practice, but is followed up
with a different experience of individual influence and collective responsibilty. Such
experience wil give people a natural identification and a feeling of integrity.
It is therefore important to accompany administrative decentralisation with a training and
practice in democratie attitudes and behaviour in everyday life. In a rural society, democracy
is hardly possible without decentralisation. But decentralisation without the active experience
of democracy could even discredit the term democracy further. Only the combination of
decentralisation with democracy can associate both with the personal emotional integrity and
national identity needed to grow democratie practice in local roots.
Such local experience is needed also to as sure a healthy national identity, which does not give
ro om for one nationality overshadowing others. Nor need an ethnically defined national
identity exclude a strong feeling of belonging to the Ethiopian nation. A solid local
integration gives room for multi-Iayered and more multiple identities. One can be a Muslim
or a Christian in religious context, an Oromo, Amhara or Tigray, Nuer, Afar or Guji for social
purposes, a supporter of the peasant association of Merhabete or Alle Oua in local context,
and of W ollega or Manz or Gojjam in a regional one, an Ethiopian in larger political affairs,
an African in international ones, and an active supporter for the local edir when family
festivals are to be celebrated, all at the same time and without one interfering with the others.
Likewise, an ethnic national identity need not weaken the central government. To the
contrary, if based on active local participation and identity, a national identity as Oromo or
Amhara, Sidamo or Afar can go a long way towards defusing the explosive potential for
conflct between central power and the nationalist movements, giving both an opportunity to
coexist and compete in a multi-tier government system.
Nor does such national identity demand that the State give up its sovereignty. Rather,
sovereignty wil be returned to where it belongs: to the people. In any case, the idea of
national sovereignty of state government is a remnant of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, and
is ripe for a discreet burial. The people (not the state) ought to be considered the sovereign
power in a democratie state. There is no reason why the state should be more sovereign than
a local community, district or regional administration, or super-regional federation; nor, for
that matter, than a church congregation, a peasant association, labour union or football club.
All derive their authority from the people they represent. All these institutions should be
controlled by their members, and their leaders be dismissed if they use their office for their
own gain, or try to exceed their mandate and to impose their own wil over those whom they
are elected to represent.
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A programme of democratie education in rural areas
National identity based not on blind allegianee to a more or less abstract nation, but on
personal integrity derived from the experience of active membership and co-responsibility in
a community, is the necessary foundation for building a new decentralised democracy in
Ethiopia. It has to start from locallevel, and it has to start from the everyday experience of
rural people.
Rural traditions are difficult to build on. But the mobilisation of the rural majority may be
the only chanee to create a demand from below for democracy. Only when people in the
peasant associations and in the local administrations demand that their interests are to be
taken serious, and that administrators have to respect their rights and to attend to their needs,
can democracy as a national project have a chanee of success. After all, democracy is to be
measured not by the frequency or smooth administration of multi-party elections, but by the
influence of ordinary people on those decisions that affect their lives. These two criteria are
not opposed but belong together; but the criterion of empowerment is the superior one.
To contribute to a mobilisation of the democratie wil of the rural people, building on local
traditions, a training programme for democracy was started with assistance from a group of
European Church Aid agencies in Ethiopia in the preparation of the 1995 elections. This
initiative addresses the ordinary people in rural and urban areas. It teaehes them not only
how elections work and how the state organises the division of powers and the pluralism of
opinion. More basically, it tries to engage people in a discussion, starting with questions like:
How are decisions made in your family? Who is involved in discussing, who is not, and
why? And who decides in your community, in the neighbourhood organisations, the mutual
aid groups, the church congregations and sports clubs? What are your rights as a citizen?
Can a policeman arrest you because your donkey ate the grain of your neighbour? Should
a woman be allowed to participate in a meeting on agricultural issues?
Such discussions are hoped to contribute to a popular pressure for everyday democracy and
respect for human rights in rural life. It ought contribute to a "counter-force" to the "civil
society" on local - and rural - level, which puts the interests of the rural majority on the
political map and makes local tradition applicable in political life.
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